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Abstract
In this paper we generalize the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixed-
duopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield
Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is
involved.
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1 Introduction
One of the most cited papers in the oligopoly related theoretical literature is that of Kreps
and Scheinkman (1983). In this seminal paper, the authors claim that Cournot competition
leads to an outcome which is equivalent to the equilibrium of a two-stage game, where there
is simultaneous production after which price competition occurs. This is an important result
given the popularity of the Cournot model, as it solves the price-setting problem represented
by the mythical Walrasian auctioneer in quantity-setting games.
Since then, many papers dealt with this equivalence trying to exploit its boundaries.
Firstly, Davidson and Deneckere (1986) challenged the validity of the result by replacing the
efficient rationing rule used by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and showed that the result
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fails to hold.1 Furthermore, Reynolds and Wilson (2000) introduced demand uncertainty
to the model and pointed out that equilibrium capacities are not equal to the Cournot
quantities. In their model the uncertainty prevails only at the time when firms choose
capacities. However, at the beginning of the second stage the demand is observed and
prices are set in a deterministic way.2 On the other hand, when uncertainty persists in the
price-setting stage, de Frutos and Fabra (2011) illustrate that under mild assumptions the
total welfare is equivalent to the Cournot case, yet the capacity levels are asymmetric even
when firms are ex-ante identical.
Boccard and Wauthy (2000 and 2004) generalize Kreps and Scheinkman’s (1983) result
to multi-player markets assuming efficient rationing and identical cost functions. Moreover,
under similar conditions Loertscher (2008) proves that the equivalence result holds when
firms compete in the input and the output market at the same time. More recently, Wu, Zhu
and Sun (2012) generalized the celebrated equivalency result by relaxing the assumptions
imposed on the demand and cost functions.
In this paper we extend the Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) result to the case in which a
private firm competes with a public firm, that is, to the case of a so-called mixed duopoly.
The idea of mixed oligopolies as a possible form of regulation was introduced by Merrill
and Schneider (1966). Its relevance stems from the possibility of increasing social welfare
through the presence of a public firm in the market. Indeed, it is common to observe public
and private firms competing in the same industry.3
As for studies of mixed oligopolies, the Cournot game was examined by Harris and
Wiens (1980), Beato and Mas-Colell (1984), Cremer, Marchand and Thisse (1989) and de
Fraja and Delbono (1989). Balogh and Tasnádi (2012) studied the price-setting game for
given capacities. Therefore, in order to extend the Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) result for
mixed duopolies, the solution of the capacity game is required. For linear demand and cost
functions this solution was given by Bakó and Tasnádi (2014), but that requires the private
firm to be more cost-efficient than the public firm. However, as we will see, in the case of
strictly convex cost and general demand functions there is no need for such an assumption.4
In the remainder of the paper we first present our setup and then solve the mixed
Cournot game followed by the results on the price-setting game. Finally, we determine the
equilibrium capacity levels and summarize our results.
1For more about rationing rules see, for instance, Vives (1999) or Wolfstetter (1999).
2Lepore (2012) generalizes Reynolds and Wilson (2000) results for a wide range of demand uncertainties
with different rationing rules.
3A few notable examples for public firms are: the Kiwibank, which is a state owned commercial bank in
New-Zealand; Amtrak, the railway company in USA; the Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited, which
is owned by the Indian Government; the Norwegian Statoil, owned in 60% by the national government; or
in the aviation industry Aeroflot, Air New-Zealand, Finnair, Qatar Airways are all owned in majority by
their national government.
4Tomaru and Kiyono (2010) analyzes the linear and convex case separately in timing games for mixed
duopolies for exactly the same reason.
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2 The Model
Consider a mixed duopoly in which two firms, A and B, produce perfectly substitutable
products. Firm A is a private firm and maximizes its profit, while Firm B is a public firm
and aims to maximize total surplus.
The market demand function is given by D on which we impose the following assump-
tions:
Assumption 1 (i) D intersects the horizontal axis at quantity a and the vertical axis at
price b; (ii) D is strictly decreasing, concave and twice-continuously differentiable on (0, a);
(iii) D is right-continuous at 0 and left-continuous at b; and (iv) D(p) = 0 for all p ≥ b.
Note, that based on this assumption none of the firms sets its price above b. Denote by
P the inverse demand function, that is P (q) = D−1 (q) for 0 < q ≤ a, P (0) = b, and
P (q) = 0 for all q > a.
The firms cost functions are given by Ci (i = A,B) and we assume that:
Assumption 2 (i) Ci(0) = 0; (ii) C ′i(0) < b and (iii) Ci is strictly increasing, convex and
twice-continuously differentiable on [0,∞).
3 The mixed Cournot duopoly
The private firm is a profit-maximizer and its profit function can be given as:
piA(qA, qB) = P (qA + qB)qA − CA(qA) (1)
while the public firm intends to maximize social welfare, hence its objective function is as
follows:
piB(qA, qB) =
∫ qA+qB
0
P (z)dz − CA(qA)− CB(qB) (2)
In equilibrium firms produce quantities which satisfy the equation system derived from
the first order conditions:
∂piA(qA,qB)
∂qA
= P ′(qA + qB)qA + P (qA + qB)− C ′A(qA) = 0,
∂piB(qA,qB)
∂qB
= P (qA + qB)− C ′B(qB) = 0.
(3)
Example 1 Let P (q) = 1− p, CA(qA) = 14q2A and CB(qB) = 16q2A.
The social welfare for this example is depicted in Figure 1 by the shaded area when firms
produce quantities qA = 1/2 and qB = 1/3.
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Figure 1: Social welfare in a mixed Cournot duopoly.
4 The mixed Kreps–Scheinkman game
Now, we assume that firms are involved in the following two-stage game: firstly they choose
their capacity level simultaneously and non-cooperatively and secondly they compete in a
Bertrand fashion. Moreover, we assume that firms can produce up to their capacity levels at
zero unit cost in the subsequent production stage, however producing beyond their capacity
levels is impossible (or stated otherwise, unit costs rise discontinuously to infinity).
To solve the game we use backward induction. Suppose that in the first stage firms
install capacities kA and kB and these decisions are common knowledge. Without loss of
generality we can assume that kA, kB ∈ [0, a]. Taking capacities as given, we analyze the
price-setting game in which firms choose their prices pi ∈ [0, P (0)] (i = A,B) to maximize
their payoffs.
To determine firms’ demand and profit functions, we employ the efficient rationing
rule.5 The firm which sets the lower price faces the market demand, while the firm with
the higher price has a residual demand of Dri (pi) = max{0, D(pi) − kj}. In the case of
pA = pB the following tie-breaking rule is used for mixed duopolies: if prices are higher
than a threshold p (explicitly determined later on) the demand is allocated in proportion
5Suppose firm i charges the lowest price (pi). If Si(pi) < D(pi), where Si(pi) denotes i’s competitive
supply, not all consumers who want to buy from firm i are able to do so. The efficient rationing rule
suggests that the most eager consumers are the ones who are able to purchase from firm i, that is the
residual demand function of firm j 6= i can be obtained by shifting the market demand function to the left
by Si(pi). This rationing rule is called efficient because it maximizes consumer surplus. For more details
we refer to Vives (1999) or Wolfstetter (1999).
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of the firms’ capacities, however if prices are not higher than p the public firm allows the
private firm to serve the entire demand up to its capacity level.6 Formally,
qi = ∆i(pi, pj) =

min{ki, D(pi)} if pi < pj ,
min{ki, Dri (pi)} if pi > pj ,
min{ki, kiki+kjD(pi)} if pi = pj > p,
min{ki, D(pi)} if pi = pj ≤ p and i = A,
min{ki, Dri (pi)} if pi = pj ≤ p and i = B.
(4)
Firms’ objective functions can be given as:
piA(pA, pB) = pAqA, (5)
and
piB(pA, pB) =
∫ min{kj ,max{0,D(pj)−ki}}
0
Rj(q)dq +
∫ min{ki,a}
0
P (q)dq, (6)
where 0 ≤ pi ≤ pj ≤ b and Rj(q) = (Drj )−1(q). Note that, since capacities are set in the
first stage of the game and their costs are already sunk, firms objective functions are free
of costs.
For Example 1 we illustrate firms’ profits and consumers’ surplus in Figure 2. The
lightest-grey triangle corresponds to the surplus realized by the consumers who purchase
the product at the highest price, while the light-grey area depicts the surplus realized by
the other consumers. On the producers’ side, the low-price firm’s surplus is given by the
darkest-grey rectangular and the high-price firm’s surplus by the dark-grey area. Note that
total welfare is determined by the higher price, except when the residual demand equals
zero at the higher price.
Let us denote the market clearing price by pc and the firm i’s (i = A,B) unique revenue
maximizing price on the firm’s residual demand curve by pmi , hence:
pc = P (kA + kB) and pmi = arg max
p∈[0,P (0)]
pDri (p).
Furthermore, let pdi be the lowest price satisfying equation
pdi min{ki, D(pdi )} = pmi Dri (pmi ),
6For prices higher than p we could have used many other tie-breaking rules, e.g. the tie-breaking rule
used by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), the only requirement is that none of the firms should have the
possibility to serve the market entirely. For more about the employed tie-breaking rule we refer to Balogh
and Tasnádi (2012).
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Figure 2: Total welfare in price-setting game
thus, by choosing pdi and selling min{ki, D(pdi )}, firm i generates the same amount of profit
as it would by setting pmi and serving the residual demand.
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Based on Berge’s Maximum Theorem pirA(p
m
A ) = maxpA pi
r
A(pA) = maxpA pAD
r
A(pA) is
continuous in (kA, kB) and since pmA is unique p
m
A is continuous function of (kA, kB) as well.
Therefore, pdi is continuous in (kA, kB), whenever p
d
i is well defined.
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4.1 Solving the price-setting game
In this subgame kA and kB are given parameters. If pmA ≥ pc, firms set equilibrium prices
as follows:
p∗A = p
∗
B = p
d
A (7)
or
p∗A = p
m
A and p
∗
B ≤ pdA. (8)
Moreover, if kB ≤ kA and kB ≤ D(pM ), where pM is the price set by a monopolist without
capacity constraints, i.e. pM = arg maxp∈[0,P (0)] pD(p), the following price-profiles are also
part of the equilibrium:
p∗A = max{pM , P (kA)} and p∗B > max{pM , P (kA)}. (9)
7To abbreviate our expressions we omit the variables kA and kB of Dri , pii, pc, pmi and pdi . However,
keep in mind that these expressions depend on the capacity levels chosen in the first stage of the game.
8pdi is well defined, whenever pmi ≥ pc. Note that, if pmA = pc then pdA = pc. See Balogh and Tasnádi
(2012).
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If, however pmA < p
c, in equilibrium firms set prices as follows:
p∗A = p
∗
B = p
c. (10)
Henceforward, we will refer to the first case (pmA ≥ pc) as the strong private firm case
and to the latter (pmA < p
c) as the weak private firm case. At this point we can already
define p introduced before Equation (4): let p = pdA if p
m
A ≥ pc and p = 0 otherwise.
In the strong private firm case the equilibrium given by (7) Pareto dominates the one
given by (8). Furthermore, the not always existing (9) describes situations when the public
firm is inactive. Therefore in what follows we consider (7) as the solution of the price-setting
game in the strong private firm case.9
Hence, firms’ equilibrium quantities can be given as:
q∗A = min{kA, D(pdA)} and q∗B = min{kB, DrB(p∗B)}. (11)
4.2 The capacity-choice game
Let us denote the set of capacity-profiles compatible with the weak private firm case as
Kc =
{
(kA, kB) ∈ [0, a]2 | pmA (kA, kB) ≤ P (kA + kB)
}
and with the strong private firm case as
Kd =
{
(kA, kB) ∈ [0, a]2 | pmA (kA, kB) > P (kA + kB)
}
Notice that Kc is a closed set, since pmA and P are continuous.
To determine pdA, first we need to consider p
m
A , which by definition is the price maxi-
mizing p(D(p)− kB).10 That is, pmA satisfies the following first order condition:
∂pirA
∂p
(pmA ) = p
m
AD
′ (pmA ) +D (p
m
A )− kB = 0. (12)
Based on Assumption 1, ∂pi
r
A
∂p is strictly decreasing, p
m
A is unique and, as it can be checked
easily, pmA is independent from kA.
The boundary curve dividing the strong and the weak private firm case is given by
pmA (kA, kB) = p
c = P (kA +kB). For any given kB, if kA satisfies pmA (kA, kB) = P (kA +kB),
then for every capacity k′A ∈ [0, kA) we have that pmA (k′A, kB) < P (k′A + kB), which is the
case because the left-hand side is independent of k′A and the right-hand side is decreasing
in k′A. Thus, for every kB there exists a k
∗
A such that the projection of K
c at kB equals
[0, k∗A].
9For more details on selecting (7) as the most plausible equilibrium we refer to Balogh and Tasnádi
(2012).
10Bear in mind that we have to consider the case kB = a separately. In this situation pmA is not unique,
since any price leads to zero profit. Let pmA (kA, a) = 0, since then pmA will be left-continuous at a.
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We show that the boundary curve, which is defined by the implicit equation pmA (kA, kB) =
pc = P (kA + kB), is strictly decreasing in (kA, kB). The implicit equation defining the
boundary curve can be expressed as
D′ (P (kA + kB))P (kA + kB) + kA + kB − kB = 0
from which under Assumption 1 by the Implicit Function Theorem we obtain
∂kB
∂kA
= −D
′′(P (kA + kB))P ′(kA + kB)P (kA + kB) +D′(P (kA + kB))P ′(kA + kB) + 1
D′′(P (kA + kB))P ′(kA + kB)P (kA + kB) +D′(P (kA + kB))P ′(kA + kB)
= −1− 1
P ′(kA + kB) (D′′(P (kA + kB))P (kA + kB) +D′(P (kA + kB)))
< 0.
Furthermore, let us divide Kd into two subsets as follows:
Kd1 =
{
(kA, kB) ∈ Kd | kA ≤ D
(
pdA (kA, kB)
)}
and
Kd2 =
{
(kA, kB) ∈ Kd | kA > D
(
pdA (kA, kB)
)}
.
We turn to determining the projection of the set Kd2 for any given kB. The condition
D(pdA) < kA defining K
d
2 is equivalent to the condition pdA > P (kA). We thus define:
f(kA) = p
d
A − P (kA) =
pmA (D(p
m
A )− kB)
kA
− P (kA) = c
kA
− P (kA),
where c = pirA(p
m
A ) depends only on kB. While the sign of f
′ is ambiguous, f ′′ > 0, that is f
is strictly convex. Moreover, limkA→0+ f(kA) =∞ and f(a) > 0. Let us denote the capacity
levels on the boundary of sets Kc and Kd by k′A, that is p
m
A (k
′
A, kB) = p
c = P (k′A + kB).
It can be shown that f(k′A) < 0, thus for any given kB there exists a k
∗
A so that the
projection of the set Kd2 equals (k∗A, a]. Based on these results Figure 3 illustrates the
spatial arrangement of Kc, Kd1 and Kd2 for Example 1.
Now, if kA ≤ D(pdA), then
pdAkA = p
m
A (D(p
m
A )− kB) ⇐⇒ pdA =
pmA (D(p
m
A )− kB)
kA
, (13)
while for kA > D(pdA), p
d
A is defined by the minimum price satisfying the following condition:
pdAD(p
d
A) = p
m
A (D(p
m
A )− kB) . (14)
Note, however, that this latter case cannot be part of the equilibria, since pdA given by
(14) is independent of kA, and for that reason the private firm could increase its profit
by choosing a lower capacity level equal to k′A = kA − ε > D(pdA). Thus, in equilibrium
kA ≤ D(pdA) holds.
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Figure 3: Set of capacities
Given the equilibrium prices, for any (kA, kB) capacity profile the firms’ objective func-
tions are as follows:
piA(kA, kB) =
{
pdAkA − CA(kA) if (kA, kB) ∈ Kd,
pckA − CA(kA) if (kA, kB) ∈ Kc (15)
and
piB(kA, kB) =
{ ∫ D(pdA)
0 P (q)dq − CA(kA)− CB(kB) if (kA, kB) ∈ Kd,∫ min{kA+kB ,a}
0 P (q)dq − CA(kA)− CB(kB) if (kA, kB) ∈ Kc.
(16)
For simplicity we neglect the arguments kA and kB of functions pdA and p
c, moreover, we
did not substitute the already determined expressions for these functions in the objective
functions.
Since solutions from Kc and Kd1 dominate the capacity levels from Kd2 we focus our
attention only on Kc and Kd1 . However, by determining
∂
∂kA
piA(kA, kB) on the interior of
Kd1 we can exclude capacities belonging to Kd1 as well. To see this, consider the private
firm’s profit function on the above mentioned interval:
piA(kA, kB) = p
d
AkA − CA(kA) = pmA (D(pmA )− kB)− CA(kA),
thus
∂
∂kA
piA(kA, kB) = −C ′(kA) < 0.
9
Hence, piA is decreasing in kA on Kd1 for any given kB, which implies that the equilibrium
solution is necessary in Kc.
Notice that the objective functions given by (15) and (16) are identical to (1) and (2)
determined for the mixed Cournot duopoly case. Yet, we have to show that the equilibrium
Cournot outcomes are in set Kc as well. To do so, let us express the second period residual
profit function defining pmA in terms of quantities and maximize:
pirA(qA) = P (qA + kB)qA
with respect to qA. The solution is denoted as qmA . For this problem the sufficient first
order condition yields
P ′(qmA + kB)q
m
A + P (q
m
A + kB) = 0. (17)
Observe that P (qmA + kB) coincides with p
m
A , since we have solved the same profit
maximization problem in two different ways. If we compare (17) with the first equation of
(3) we can see that for any kB ∈ [0, a) we have pmA = pc. Therefore, for capacities given
by P (qmA + kB) = p
c we have ∂piA∂kA (q
m
A , kB) < 0, and thus taking Assumptions 1 and 2 into
account, we can see that the first order conditions given by (3) are satisfied within Kc.
We summarize our results as follows:
Theorem 1 Given Assumptions 1 and 2, quantity precommitment and Bertrand compe-
tition yield Cournot outcomes not only in duopolies with private firms (see Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983)) but also in mixed duopolies.
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